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Abstract 
Constitutional architects usually include in constitutional texts an unamendable 
clause known as constitutional entrenchment. A constitutional entrenchment 
serves different purposes such as, shielding and preserving high valued 
constitutional norms and distancing the state from past autocratic practices. The 
study of constitutional entrenchment has attracted great attention in recent years 
since it restricts the power of constitutional amendment and thus the basic 
concepts of democracy. This article aims to provide a critical analysis to the 
entrenchment clause of Egypt’s current Constitution of 2014 through tracing 
constitutional entrenchment in different comparative jurisdictions. In doing so, 
the article examines the paradoxical-unprecedented language of Egypt’s 
constitutional entrenchment clause and its significance on the entire 
constitutional structure for being non-self-entrenchment. The article also 
discusses the position of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court regarding 
reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments and acts. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Most of the world’s constitutions permit reviewing the constitutionality 
of statutes for assuring their consistency with the constitution in a process known 
as judicial review. However, the question of whether the process of judicial 
review accommodates reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments generates great discrepancy in comparative constitutional law. 
 At first sight, the idea of subjecting a constitutional amendment to the 
process of judicial review to test its consistency with the constitution seems odd. 
William Harris described the peculiarity of the concept arguing, “the question of 
whether an amendment to the constitution could be unconstitutional seems to be 
a riddle, a paradox or an incoherency.”1 That is, as one may argue, it contradicts 
the pure nature of the judicial review process, which is usually concerned with 
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reviewing the constitutionality of ordinary-legislative statutes and executive 
regulations and ordinances. 
However, recent studies and debates suggest that defining the nature as 
well as the content of constitutional amendments and whether certain limitations 
should be imposed on the amendment power plays a pivotal role in determining 
and/or preserving the constitutional identity of a given country.
2
 
 The idea of favoring a limited amendment power for the sake of 
constitutional identity has already been the subject of extensive debates in 
numerous countries.
3
 Further, top courts of some countries such as, Brazil, 
Germany, India, and Turkey have already nullified proposed constitutional 
amendments for being in conflict with the purpose of the constitution. 
 One of the most effective ways to limit the amendment power is through 
constitutional entrenchment whereby constitutional architects include in the 
constitution a provision that renders amending or repealing certain constitutional 
norms, deemed to be super constitutional, through formal amendment rules 
inconceivably. Constitutional entrenchment has recently occupied a great portion 
of scholarly constitutional law debates especially from a comparative perspective 
regarding how constitutions of different states would curb the amendment power 
in favor of protecting some high-valued constitutional principles from being 
altered. 
 Some scholars regard constitutional entrenchment as being an effective 
mechanism to preserve the state’s constitutional identity by shielding some 
fundamental principles such as, the form of the state, the official religion, 
presidential term, rule of law, democracy, and individuals rights.
4
 However, some 
scholars have argued that the concept of constitutional entrenchment contradicts 
the basic principles of democracy because it seizes the right of the public to 
amend the constitution.
5
 
 In part I of this article, I will discuss the relation between constitutional 
entrenchment and democracy, and the different forms of constitutional 
entrenchments. I will also provide a comparative overview regarding the form 
                                                             
2 See, e.g., Claude Klein, Is There a Need for an Amending Power Theory?, 13 ISR. L. 
REV. (1978). 
3 Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Migration and 
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 659 (2013). 
4 Nicolas W. Barber, Why Entrench?, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming, 2016). 
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and the content of constitutional entrenchment provisions in the constitutions of 
some selected countries in an attempt to demonstrate how a constitutional 
entrenchment can go beyond the limit of being a mere restriction on the 
amendment practices to being a device to preserve the notion of 
superconstitutionalism and thus, to maintain constitutional identities. 
 Part II of the article sets the constitutional entrenchment provision of the 
Egyptian Constitution of 2014 as a case study. In this part, I intend to 
demonstrate how an entrenchment can be used after popular uprisings to distant 
the future of a country from past practices prior to the uprising. In this part, I will 
introduce the paradox of Egypt’s entrenchment posing the question of whether it 
really intends to protect some of the most super constitutional principles or just 
mere private-factional interests. In doing so, I will shed significant light on the 
dangers that Egypt’s entrenchment possesses as being a non-self-entrenched 
provision. 
 Eventually, the article examines the approach of the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court in reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments so as to protect the non-self-entrenched provision. The article will 
also cite the practices of some comparative constitutional models such as the 
Brazilian, the Czech, the Indian, the Romanian, and the Turkish models in 
dealing with this issue. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT: SETTING THE 
BOUNDARIES 
 
 In the constitution-making process, constitutional drafters may agree to 
render certain constitutional provisions unamendable. These unamendable 
provisions are also called entrenchment,
6
 eternity,
7
 nonamendable,
8
 and 
                                                             
6 See e.g. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, 
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. (2003); 
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local 
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 887 (2011); Russell Patrick Plato, Selective 
Entrenchment Against State Constitutional Change: Subject Matter Restrictions and the 
Threat of Differential Amendability, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2007); Scott J. Bowman, Wild 
Political Dreaming: Constitutional Reformation of the United States Senate, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1028 (2004). 
7 See e.g. Robert J. Delahunty, The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why do American and 
European Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?, 4 LOY. INT’L L. REV. 11, 29-30 
(2006); Andrew Friedman, Dead Hand Constitutionalism: Honduras and the Danger of 
Eternity Clauses in New Democracies, 4 MEX. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010); Donaled P. 
Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L. J. 837, 846 
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perpetuity
9
 provisions.
10
 In this article, these forms of unamendability will be 
referred to as entrenchment provisions or clauses. Having said that, a 
constitutional entrenchment provision is immune to an amendment in that it can 
be amended neither by constitutional amendment rules as prescribed in the 
constitutional text or by a legislative action nor by judicial construction. 
 This understanding of entrenchment provisions must be distinguished 
from other competing concepts. Specifically, as noted by Richard Albert, a 
constitutional entrenchment provision should not be confused with other 
constitutional provisions that require certain kinds of supermajorities to be 
amended or revoked.
11
 For example, based on Arend Lijphart’s study of 
constitutional amendment difficulty, the constitutions of five democracies, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States, occupied the top 
list as regard to their rigidity (4.0) for requiring supermajorities beyond the 
famous two-third majority to render an amendment to be rendered valid.
12
 
However, this does not refute that fact that all these rigid constitutions can be 
amended if their hard standards of amendability have somehow been reached. 
Similarly, a constitutional entrenchment provision should be distinguished from 
constitutional provisions that are unlikely to be amended or repealed just because 
their amendment standards are significantly hard to be met.
13
 For instance, 
according to Donald Lutz’s index of constitutional amendment difficulty, the 
Constitution of the United States ranked as the most rigid scoring (5.10) followed 
by Sweden and Venezuela (tied at 4.75), Australia (4.65), and Costa Rica 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1991); Christian Joerges, A European Union of, by and for the Citizens: How Can 
Europe Provide for better Participation of its Citizens?, 16 Y.B. POLISH EUR. STUD. 141, 
151 (2013). 
8 See e.g. Craig Scot, The Transnationalization of Truth: A Meditation on Sri Lanka and 
Honduras, 5 ETHICS IN ACTION 36, 42, 46 (2011); KATHARINA DIEHL, JOHANNA 
MANTEL, MATTHIAS REUSS & JAN SCHMIDT, MAX PLANCK MANUALS ON CONSTITUTION 
BUILDING: STRUCTURES AND PRINCIPLES OF A CONSTITUTION 2ND ED. 103 (2009); 
Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1861, 1862 (2004). 
9 See e.g. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 274 (2000); HEINRICH AUGUST 
WINKLER, GERMANY: THE LONG ROAD WEST: VOLUME 2: 1933-1990 124 (2000); Steven 
J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1769 (2014); Gunnar Beek, The Idea of Human Rights Between Value Pluralism and 
Conceptual Vagueness, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 615, 615, n. 2 (2007). 
10 Richard Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 38 (2008). 
11 Id., at 38-39. 
12 AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 220 (Yale University Press, 1999). 
13 Albert, Supra note 10, at 39. 
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(4.10).
14
 Despite their strong rigidity, these constitutions are, nevertheless, still 
amendable if their amendment formula has been achieved. An entrenchment 
constitutional provision, likewise, is different from a constitutional provision that 
requires special involvement either from the legislature or the general public or 
both.
15
 For example, in protecting a parliamentary electoral system, the 
Constitution of Israel (1958) shields the procedures for electing members of the 
Knesset from an amendment except if a parliamentary majority vote is reached.
16
 
In addition, the Constitution of Ghana (1996) requires for an “entrenched” 
provision to be amended the approval of the State Council as well as the 
Parliament before being approved at a popular referendum.
17
 Finally, a 
constitutional entrenchment is also different from other constitutional provisions 
that are regarded unamendable simply because of the absence of a rule to 
organize their amendment procedures, like the situation in the interim and 
concluding provisions of the Russian Constitution.
18
 
 
                                                             
14 DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitution Amendment, 88 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 355, 369 (1994). 
15 Albert, Supra note 10, at 39. 
16 See The Constitution of Israel, 1958, Section 4 of the “Basic Law: The Knesset” which 
provides “The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and 
proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall 
not be varied save by a majority of the members of the Knesset.” Thus, at least 61 
positives votes out of 120 votes in the Knesset in order to amend the article, being the 
very least among most entrenchments notwithstanding.  
17 See The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1996, c. 25, art. 290 stating “(2) A bill 
for the amendment of an entrenched provision shall, before Parliament proceeds to 
consider it, be referred by the Speaker to the Council of State for its advice and the 
Council of State shall render advice on the bill within thirty days after receiving it. (3) 
The bill shall be published in the Gazette but shall not be introduced into Parliament until 
the expiry of six months after the publication in the Gazette under this clause. (4) After 
the bill has been read the first time in Parliament it shall not be proceeded with further 
unless it has been submitted to a referendum held throughout Ghana and at least forty 
percent of the persons entitled to vote, voted at the referendum and at least seventy0five 
percent of the persons who voted case their votes in favour of the passing of the bill. (5) 
Where the bill is approved at the referendum, Parliament shall pass it. (6) Where a bill for 
the amendment of a n entrenched provision has been passed by Parliament in accordance 
with this article, the President shall assent to it.” Likewise, The Lithuanian Constitution, 
(1992), ch. XIV, art. 148 provides “The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution “the 
State of Lithuania shall be an independent democratic republic” may only be altered by 
referendum if not less than 3/4 [three-fourths] of the citizens of Lithuania with the 
electoral right vote in favor thereof. The provisions of the First Chapter “The State of 
Lithuania” and the Fourteenth Chapter “Alteration of the Constitution” may be altered 
only by referendum.” 
18 Albert, Supra note 10, at 39. 
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II. ENTRENCHMENT VS. DEMOCRACY 
 After determining the meaning of constitutional entrenchment and setting 
the boundaries between it and other competing concepts, now comes the question 
of what is the wisdom behind ruling out formal amendments concerning certain 
constitutional provisions. More precisely, why do constitutions tend to entrench 
some of their provisions? 
 In his Social Contract (1762), Jean-Jacques Rousseau drew a picture of 
an ideal community where a group of free citizens living in a small state in which 
democracy could be practiced directly by them as they share responsibility for 
the whole of the community.
19
 Direct democracy, which means “delegation of 
political decisions to the ordinary voter,”20 was the outcome of the doctrine of the 
consent of the governed.
21
 The main theory of Rousseau and that of direct 
democracy is that the people being subject to the laws, ought to be their 
authors.
22
 For being an unrealistic model of democracy to be applied nowadays, 
mostly because of the remarkable increase in population and the demand need of 
specialization in modern communities where power overlaps, direct democracy 
was replaced by other models such as, representative democracy (indirect 
democracy) and sensible democracy (semi-direct democracy).
23
 
 The disappearance of direct democracy and the retreat of the people’s 
direct involvement gave a way for the emergence of some mechanisms through 
which people can practice democracy within certain specific limits. One of these 
mechanisms is constitutions. Despite the fact that constitutionalism, as Neil 
                                                             
19 ERNEST BARKER ED., SOCIAL CONTRACT: LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU (Oxford 
University Press, 1962); see also RICHARD FRALIN, ROUSSEAU AND REPRESENTATION 
(Columbia University Press, 1978). 
20
 Nathaniel Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 
13 (1997). 
21 The earliest known direct democracy could be dated to Ancient Athens where ancient 
Athenians practiced authority directly in a popular assembly deciding over political 
affairs and war and peace matters, and concluding treaties. They also reserved for 
themselves the power to appoint judges and monitoring them. Direct democracy was also 
evident in Ancient Rome where systems of citizen lawmaking and citizen veto of 
legislature-made law had developed. See H. H. SCULLARD & M. CARY, A HISTORY OF 
ROME: DOWN TO THE REIGN OF CONSTANTINE (St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 
22 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL 39 (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
23 For more information, see generally Id.; BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: 
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (University of California Press, 1984); FRANK 
PARSONS ET AL., A PRIMER OF DIRECT-LEGISLATION (1906); DELOS F. WILCOX, 
GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE 169 (1912). 
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Walker puts it, “came first and foremost to be defined in functional opposition to 
absolutism, as a guarantee of limited (by law) government as opposed to 
unlimited government,”24 constitutionalism and democracy indeed have been 
construed as being internally related and congenitally opposed. They are related 
because the very simple aim of constitutions is to set forth rules of democracy in 
a given state.
25
 They oppose each other, nevertheless, because constitutions 
impose restrictions on the ability of the people to rule themselves and further 
constrain the power of the people to change or reform democracy itself.
26
 
 Whereas constitutionalism, largely, aims to constitute how a given state 
ought to function politically, it does so by limiting the political power of the 
people through legal means enshrined in different types of constitutions,
27
 the 
matter that creates a real tension with the basic concept of democracy as the rule 
of the people.
28
 It should be noted that since the advent of written constitutions, 
constitutionalism has been a tool to advance countermajoritarian that it restricts 
the practice of democracy and imposes further limits on the will of the people 
and expressions.
29
 Whereas democracy only concerns with the collective will of 
the general public, constitutionalism, in an attempt to loosen the dangers of 
majoritarianism, chooses to neutralize the popular will by constraining actions of 
the general public and curbing their ambitions.
30
 
 Being only concerned with the consent of the governed, democracy 
distances itself from constitutionalism in that it tends to concentrate power it 
asserts in that popular preferences must flow from the majoritarian rule and 
                                                             
24 Neil Walker, Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
Relationship, 3 NETH. J.  LEGAL PHIL. 206, 209 (2010). 
25 See generally RICHARD BELLAMY, ED., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
(Ashgate Dartmouth, 2006). 
26 Id. 
27 Legal theorist Phillip Allot distinguishes between three types of constitutions: “the 
legal constitution (a structure and system of retained acts of will), the real constitution 
(the constitution as actualised in the current social process, a structure and a system of 
power), and the ideal constitution (a constitution as it presents to society an idea of what 
society might be.” PHILLIP ALLOT, EUNOMIA, NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 2ND ED. 
135-136 (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
28 Wouter G. Werner, Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Question of Authority, 3 
NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 267, 269 (2010); José Julián Álvarez González, Another Look at 
the Discretionary Constitution, 71 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 22 (2002); James E. Fleming, The 
Missing Selves in Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1789, 1793 
(2003); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
211, 219 n.35 (1993). 
29 Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 664 (2010). 
30 Id. 
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regards countermajoritarian as being an attempt to seize the will of the people.
31
 
In limiting the dangers of majoritarianism, constitutionalists have invented some 
concepts and devices such as, legislative representation, federalism, and judicial 
review.  The latter, in particular, has always been a perceived obstacle in the way 
of constitutionalists as constitutionalism’s opponents condemns the power of the 
judiciary to invalidate laws that are the product of the will of the majority. 
 To help soften the severity of judicial review and indeed loosening the 
tension between constitutionalism and democracy, constitutionalists tend to limit 
the scope of judicial review by rendering parliamentary legislation superior so 
that courts cannot review them.
32
 Others instruct courts to avoid invalidating 
legislation by declaring them just incompatible,
33
 or by interpreting them in such 
a way as not to create a conflict with the constitution.
34
 
 Perhaps constitutional entrenchment is the most powerful tool for 
constitutionalism to impose limitations on the sovereignty of people. Precisely, in 
a legal fashion, the power to amend the constitution is a remarkable solution that 
decisively settles the rivalry in favor of democracy since the authority to amend 
the constitution is indeed one of the constituent powers in the hands of the people 
                                                             
31 See Id. In reviewing Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the 
Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It), Randy Barnett 
highlights the countermajoritarian feature of the U.S. Constitution arguing, “It is counter-
majoritarian by design. Precisely because the founders feared majoritarian fecklessness 
and abuse, they inserted the veto points to which Levinson objects. Most people today—
whether left, right, or libertarian—still fear majoritarian rule. They believe they have 
more to fear from their political opponents gaining power than they have to gain from 
putting their friends in office. Indeed, many Americans revere the Constitution precisely 
because of its counter-majoritarianism—the checks and balances adopted by the 
founders.” RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 52-54 (Claremont Rev. 
Books, 2007). 
32 According to the English theory of Parliamentary Supremacy, laws passed by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom are regarded as “primary legislations” that are 
immune from being reviewed by courts unless they are contrary to the law of the 
European Union. 
33 See, e.g., The United Kingdom Human Rights Act of 1998, § 4 stating, “If the court is 
satisfied—(a)that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, and (b)that 
(disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary legislation concerned prevents 
removal of the incompatibility, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.” 
34 According to Article 190 of the Swiss Constitution of 1999, which provides “The 
Federal Supreme Court and the other authorities applying the law shall follow the federal 
statutes and international law,” courts have the power to review the constitutionality of 
federal statues, but will construct statutes so as not to render them inconsistent with the 
Constitution. 
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to practice their sovereignty.
35
 To see the point more clearly, unlike constituted 
power, which is a power created and established by the constitutional text itself, 
constituent power is actually the power of the people to consent to create a 
constitution.
36
 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyés describes the constituent power saying 
“in each of its parts a constitution is not the work of a constituted power but a 
constituent power.”37 
 Accordingly, the phenomenon of constitutional unamendability, which is 
created by virtue of entrenching certain provisions in the constitutional text, 
possesses an imminent threat to the constituent power to such an extent that it 
confiscates citizenry right in amending the constitution. Having this in mind, now 
I will pose the same question I posed earlier with a little twist: being one of the 
main drawbacks of constitutionalism that undermines democratic values, why are 
most of the world’s constitutional architects eager to construct unamendable 
provisions in the constitutions? 
III. PURPOSES OF ENTRENCHMENT 
 For a constitution to entrench some of its provisions, it intends to protect 
certain principles from being altered or subverted. These principles are seen as 
being of great importance that they help shape and define the state to such an 
extent that they need to be shielded in the constitution. 
 Entrenchment provisions could be used to preserve the fundamental 
structure of the state, i.e. federalism, unitarism, pillarisation, or secularism. The 
German Basic Law, for example, aims to preserve the federal structure of the 
state through an unamendable constitutional provision, which reads as follow: 
“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
Länder [and] their participation on principle in the legislative process…shall be 
inadmissible.”38 Thus, according to this provision, the organization of Germany 
as a federal republic is permanently maintained and even the most compelling 
popular majorities cannot alter it pursuant to this constitutional order. In addition, 
                                                             
35 See Claude Klein, A propos Constituent Power: Some General Views in a Modern 
Context, in National Constitutions in the Era of Integration 31, 40 (Antero Jyränki ed., 
1999). 
36 See Yaniv Roznai describing constituent power to mean “the immediate expression of 
the nation and thus its representative.” Roznai, supra note 3, at 664. 
37 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÉS, POLITICAL WRITINGS 136 (2003). 
38 GRUNDGESETZ DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [BASIC LAW], c. VII, art 79(3) 
(Germany, 1949) [Hereinafter: The German Basic Law]. 
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in order to ensure the good function of federalism, the German unamendable 
provision prohibits amendments that deny the constituent states of Germany, 
Länder, a voice in the legislative process. Likewise, the Constitution of Brazil 
(1988) followed the Basic German Law in entrenching the federal structure of the 
state when it stipulated in Article 60 that “No proposed constitutional amendment 
shall be considered that is aimed at abolishing the following: (I) the federalist 
form of the National Government…”39 Equally, in preserving the fundamental 
structure of the state, the Romania Constitution of 1991 forbids constitutional 
amendments that seek to change the Romanian unitary system.
40
 Similarly, the 
Portuguese Constitution shields the principle of secularism by prohibiting 
amendments revoking the separation between church and state.
41
 
 Moreover, an entrenchment clause could be deployed to protect the form 
of government in a given state, i.e. republicanism, monarchy, or amiri.
42
 For 
instance, the Egyptian Constitutions of 1923 and 1930 shield the representative 
parliamentary system and the throne’s inheritance against amendments.43 
Moreover, the Italian Constitution of 1948 and the French Constitution of 1958 
ban any constitutional amendment to revoke the republic form of the state.
44
 
Likewise, the Greek Constitution of 1975 and the Turkish Constitution of 1981 
prohibit any constitutional amendment to change the designation of Greece and 
Turkey as parliamentary republics.
45
 In addition, Constitutions of some 
                                                             
39 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [CONST.], artigo [art.] 60(§4°) (Brazil). 
40 CONSTITUŢIA ROMÂNIEI [CONST.] art. 152(1) (Romania). 
41 “Constitutional revision laws shall respect: …(c) The separation between church and 
state.” PORTUGAL CONST. art. 288(c) (1976).  
42 Roznai, supra note 3, at 667. 
43 “The King and each of both Houses may propose the revision of the present 
Constitution by amending or omitting one or more provisions thereof, or adding other 
provisions. However, the provisions on the representative parliamentary system of 
government, the throne’s inheritance, and the principles of freedom and equality provided 
for hereby may not be proposed for revision.” EGYPT CONSTS., arts. 156 & 145 (1923 & 
1930). 
44 “The republican form [of the State] cannot be a matter of constitutional revision.” LA 
COSTITUZIONE [CONST.] art. 139 (Italy). “The republican form of government shall not be 
the object of any amendment.” LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.] tit. XVI, art. 89 (France). 
45 “The provisions of the Constitution shall be subject to revision with the exception of 
those which determine the form of government as a Parliamentary Republic and those of 
articles 2 paragraph 1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 , 5 paragraphs 1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 
26.” ARTHRO [ART.] 110(1) SYNT. [CONST.] (Greece); “The provision of Article 1 of the 
Constitution establishing the form of the State as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 
on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be 
amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed.” TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI 
[CONST.] part I, art. 4 (Turkey). 
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monarchies such as Bahrain, Morocco, and Qatar make any amendment to the 
monarchy system of government inadmissible.
46
 Further, the Constitution of 
Kuwait declares the “Amiri Regime” in the state immune against any amendment 
attempt.
47
 
 Other features that could be protected by constitutional entrenchments 
are those related to the “self-identity of the state.” For example, some 
constitutions like that of Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, and Tunisia entrench the 
official religion of the state.
48
 Similarly, some states like Bahrain, Romania, and 
Turkey choose to entrench the official language of the state in their 
constitutions.
49
 
 Constitutional designers may also use entrenchment provisions to protect 
a wide range of constitutional rights and freedoms as well as sovereignty of 
people. Under the Constitution of Romania (1991), for example, constitutional 
amendments resulting in the elimination of citizenry rights and freedoms granted 
by the constitution are void.
50
 The Bosnian and Herzegovinian Constitution 
(1995) likewise declares all civil and political rights unamendable.
51
 The 
Namibian Constitution similarly shields constitutional rights and liberties against 
any amendment.
52
 Similarly, the Egyptian Constitutions of 1923 and 1930 
declare principles of freedom and equality unamendable.
53
 Finally, consider the 
Constitution of Armenia (1995) that makes the principle of sovereignty of people 
unamendable.
54
 In fact, this kind of entrenchment is most likely to be adopted by 
                                                             
46 “It is not permissible to propose an amendment to Article 2 of this Constitution, and it 
is not permissible under any circumstances to propose the amendment of the 
constitutional monarchy and the principle of inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the bi-
cameral system and the principles of freedom and equality established in this 
Constitution.” BAHRAIN CONST. c. VI, art. 120(c) (1973); “No revision may infringe the 
provisions…on the monarchic form of the State.” MOROCCO CONST. art. 175 (2011); 
“The provisions relevant to the governance and inheritance of the State may not be 
subject to a request for amendment.” QATAR CONST. art 145 (2003). 
47 “Provisions relating to the Amiri Regime in Kuwait…” KUWAIT CONST., art. 175 
(1962). 
48 See AFGHANISTAN CONST., ch. X, art 149 (2004), ALGERIA CONST., tit IV, art 178(3) 
(1989), IRAN CONST, art 177 (1980), and TUNISIA CONST., art 1 (2014). 
49 See BAHRAIN CONST. c. VI, art. 120(c) (1973), CONSTITUŢIA ROMÂNIEI [CONST.], tit. 
VII, art. 152(1) (Romania, 1991); TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONST.] part I, 
art. 4 (Turkey, 1981). 
50 CONSTITUŢIA ROMÂNIEI [CONST.], tit. VII, art. 152(2) (Romania). 
51 BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA CONST., art. X, § 2. 
52 NAMIBIA CONST, ch XIX, art. 131 (1990). 
53 EGYPT CONSTS, n. 43. 
54 ARMENIA CONST., art. 114 (1995). 
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a state wishing to distance itself from a past era distinguished by an authoritarian 
rule and teemed with rights infringements. Such constitutional entrenchments, 
indeed, are seen as the state’s commitment to honor individual’s rights and 
liberties by guaranteeing the values entrenched in the constitutional provision, 
and to urge future generations and political leaders to fully respect these values.
55
 
 A constitutional entrenchment provision could also serve a temporary 
purpose that is to make a certain principle, value, or resolution unamendable for a 
defined period of time. Such entrenchment is likely to be deployed to reach a 
compromise in an attempt to bring dissonant political actors together.
56
 An 
example of this constitutional entrenchment could be found in Article V of the 
United States Constitution stating that, “Provided that no Amendment which may 
be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any 
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first 
Article.” Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 authorizes states to trade in slaves and 
prohibits Congress from passing laws that restrict slave importation.
57
 Article 1, 
Section 9, Clause 4 asserts that taxation would be apportioned based on state 
populations.
58
 Pursuant to Article V, both clauses were unamendable from the 
year of the Constitution was adopted (1789) and prior to the year 1808. Likewise, 
in a more explicit fashion, Cape Verde included in its Constitution a 
constitutional entrenchment provision that shields the entire Constitution against 
amendment for five years from the date of its promulgation.
59
 Similarly, the 
Egyptian Constitution of 1930 bans introducing amendments to the constitutional 
text for the period of 10 years from the time of its adoption.
60
 
                                                             
55
 See Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in 
ANDRÁS KOLTAY, ED., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION, at 4 (Forthcoming, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601646.  
56 Id.; see Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in 
Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 644 (2011). 
57 “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” U.S. CONST, art I, § 9, cl 1. 
58 “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” U.S. CONST, art I, § 9, cl 4. 
59 Albert, supra note 55, at 5. “This Constitution may be revised, in whole or in part, by 
the National Assembly after five years from the date of its promulgation.” CAPE VERDE 
CONST., part VI, tit III, art 309(1) (1980). 
60 (Amendments to this Constitution may not be introduced in the first ten years 
following its adoption.” EGYPT CONST., art. 156 (1930). 
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 Further, constitutional entrenchment can be used to achieve peace by 
loosening the severity of hatred between two or more rival factions. For example, 
some countries would confer unamendable amnesty upon a political faction after 
a revolution, coup d'etat, or a period of political segregation.
61
 An example of this 
is the Constitution of Niger of 2010, which entrenches in Article 175 an 
unamendable amnesty provision found in Article 185 for those who participated 
in the coup d'Etat of February 2010.
62
 
 Finally, some constitutions adopt some general constitutional 
entrenchment provisions with the purpose of protecting some highly valued 
constitutional principles.
63
 The Constitution of Norway (1814) entrenches the 
spirit of the constitution making any amendment to alter this spirit inadmissible.
64
 
Additionally, the Cuban Constitution of 1976 entrenches the principles of 
socialism and the social revolutionary political system.
65
 The Constitution of 
Nepal of 1990 likewise entrenches spirit of the Preamble of the Constitution.
66
 
                                                             
61 Albert, supra note 29, at 667. 
62 “Article 185 of this Constitution may not be made the object of any revision.” “An 
amnesty is granted to the authors, co-authors and accomplices of the coup d'Etat of 
eighteen (18) February 2010. A law will be voted, to this effect, during the first (1st) 
session of the National Assembly.” NIGER CONST., tit XII & XIV, art.(s) 175 & 185. 
Likewise, Niger superseded Constitution of 1999 granted an unamendable amnesty 
provision of authors and co-authors of the two coups of January 1996 and April 1999. 
NIGER CONST., tit XII, art.(s) 136 & 141. 
63 Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 
MCGILL L. J. 225, 254 (2013). 
64
 “…Such amendment must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in this 
Constitution, but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter 
the spirit of the Constitution…” GRUNNLOVEN [CONST.], art. 121 (Norway). 
65 “This Constitution can only be modified by the National Assembly of People’s 
Power…except [where the modification] regards the political, social and economic 
system, whose irrevocable character is established in Article 3 of Chapter I…” 
“Socialism and the social revolutionary political system instituted in this Constitution, 
proven by years of heroic resistance against all kinds of aggression and the economic war 
engaged by the government of the mightiest imperialistic power that has ever existed, and 
having demonstrated its ability to transform the country and create an entirely new and 
just society, shall be irrevocable, and Cuba shall never return to capitalism.” CONST., ch. 
I & XV, art.(s) 3 & 137 (Cuba). 
66 “A bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, without prejudicing the 
spirit of the Preamble of this Constitution, may be introduced in either House of 
Parliament:  Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment.” CONST., part 
19, art. 116(1) (Nepal). 
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The Constitution of France of 1958 deploys constitutional unamendability to 
protect the integrity of the French territory.
67
 
 In fact, the idea of constitutional entrenchment is not a new doctrine in 
the constitutional law arena; however, such invaded South America early in the 
nineteenth century when Latin states borrowed it from the U.S. Constitution.
68
 
The Mexican Constitution of 1824 entrenches principles like the official religion 
of the state, form of government, liberties, and division of power.
69
 Moreover, the 
Venezuelan Constitution of 1830 shields the republic form of government as well 
as popular representation by restricting the power of Congress to alter such 
principles through constitutional amendments.
70
 
 The idea of protecting constitutional highly valued principles by limiting 
the constitutional amendment power has originated mainly because of the “Basic 
Structure Doctrine” that certain constitutional principles must be conclusively 
unamendable.
71
 Carlo Fusaro and Dawn Oliver cited the Basic Structure Doctrine 
to legitimately justify constitutional unamendability arguing that: 
[E]very constitutional arrangement is based upon a set of core 
principles which cannot be changed and which can be regarded 
as intrinsic to its specific identity: this explains the tendency in 
many constitutional arrangements to identify a set of 
supraconstitutional provisions which the constitution’s text itself, 
or even more frequently the courts (by induction), state cannot 
be amended or suppressed. 
 
 Apart from a constitutional entrenchment that is intended to protect an 
internal structure or identity of the state such as, federalism, republicanism, 
                                                             
67
 “No amendment procedure shall be commenced or continued where the integrity of 
national territory is placed in jeopardy.” LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.] tit. XVI, art. 89 
(France). 
68 Roznai, supra note 3, at 665. 
69 “The Religion of the Mexican Nation is, and shall be perpetually, the Apostolical 
Roman Catholic.” “the Articles of this Constitution, and of the Constituent Act, which 
establish the Liberty and Independence of the Mexican Nation, its Religion, Form of 
Government, Liberty of the Press, and Division of the Supreme Power of the 
Confederation, and of the States, shall never be reformed.” CONSTITUCIÓN [CONST.] 
Artículo [art.] 3 & 171 (Mexico). 
70 “The authority possessed by Congress to modify the Constitution does not extend to 
the Form of Government, which shall always continue to be republican, popular, 
representative, responsible, and alternate.” CONST., art. 228 (Venezuela). 
71 See Yaniv Roznai, The Migration of the Indian Basic Structure Doctrine, in MALIK 
LOKENDRA ED., JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE V. 
R. KRISHNA IVER 240 (2012). 
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official religion, and secularism to preserve a certain political platform,
72
 a 
careful examination of constitutional entrenchment provisions reveals that they 
are mostly designed to protect a pack of universal principles that are likely to 
distinguish modern democracies such as human dignity, individuals liberties, 
separation of powers, and rule of law.
73
 
IV. FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL UNAMENDABILITY 
 As illustrated earlier, according to Donald Lutz’s and Arend Lijphart’s 
study of constitutional amendment difficulty, some constitutions may be regarded 
as being flexible since they adopt easy constitutional amendment rules. Other 
constitutions are regarded to be rigid thus they require difficult standards to be 
reached for a constitutional amendment to be rendered successful. However, it 
should be noted that regarding this last category of constitutions, rigidity should 
be construed to mean unamendability simply because, as explained earlier, even 
the most rigid constitution still possesses amendment rules and standards, though 
difficult and complicated, if reached, a constitutional amendment is consequently 
reached. 
 Speaking from a constitutional law perspective, rigidity is a 
constitutional feature to distinguish between a written constitution and a 
legislative bill with the purpose of giving the former more prestigious position 
than the latter.
74
 Precisely, prescribing rules that are difficult to be achieved for 
amending written constitutions than that prescribed for amending legislative bills 
is logically justified given the fact that written constitutions are considered the 
basic and supreme law of any given country. Although, constitutions of some 
countries like New Zealand, which could be amended by a simple legislative 
majority,
75
 might contradict with this view, this does not refute the common 
mainstream idea that constitutional amendment rules are one of the basic features 
that characterize a written constitution as being the supreme law of the country. 
 Unlike New Zealand, countries like the United States and Canada stand 
at the top level of the rigidity scale in terms of constitutional amendment. For 
instance, proposing a constitutional amendment to the U.S. Constitution must be 
                                                             
72 Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Formation of Constitutional Identities, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-142 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalin Dixon eds., 2011). 
73 Roznai, supra note 3, at 714. 
74 See Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67 
S.C.L.R. 181, 186 (2014). 
75 Lutz, supra note 14, at 125, 170, 176. 
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by either the Congress with a two-thirds majority vote in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate or by a constitutional convention called for by 
two-thirds of the State legislatures, which eventually needs to be ratified by 
three-fourths of the States (38 of 50 States).
76
 The Constitution of Canada 
likewise is teemed with rigidity when it comes to amendment rules.
77
 For 
instance, the default amendment procedure in the Canadian Constitution requires 
the approval of both houses of Parliament as well as that of at least two-thirds of 
the provinces.
78
 The Canadian Constitution also adopts another alternative 
procedure to amend itself, which seems to be more difficult than the previous 
one. According to this alternative amendment procedure, the approval of both 
house of Parliament as well as that legislative assembly of each province is 
needed.
79
 Further, the Constitution also introduces another amendment rule 
where the consent of both houses of Parliament as well as the legislative 
                                                             
76 “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by 
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be 
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the 
Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” U.S. CONST., art. V. 
77 Walter Dellinger described the Constitution of Canada as being “unduly rigid [and 
that] it affords little or no possibility of reforming those existing institutions of 
government which play a critical role in the amendment process.” Walter Dellinger, The 
Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, 45 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 300 (1982). Further, Bettina Petersohn argued that federalizing 
constitutional change in Canada has made amending the Constitution nearly impossible. 
Bettina Petersohn, Constitutional Reform and Federal Dynamics: Causes and Effects, in 
ARTHUR BENZ & JÖRG BROSCHEK, EDS., FEDERAL DYNAMICS: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, 
AND THE VARIETIES OF FEDERALISM  316 (2013). 
78 “An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by 
the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by (a) 
resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and (b) resolutions of the legislative 
assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to 
the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of all the 
provinces.” Constitution Act, 1867, part V, s. 38. 
79 “An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may 
be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada 
only where authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the 
legislative assembly of each province: (a) the office of the Queen, the Governor General 
and the Lieutenant Governor of a province; (b) the right of a province to a number of 
members in the House of Commons not less than the number of Senators by which the 
province is entitled to be represented at the time this Part comes into force; (c) subject to 
section 43, the use of the English or the French language; (d) the composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada; and e.an amendment to this Part.” Id. at s. 41. 
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assembly of one or more provinces affected by the proposed amendment is 
required for an amendment to be passed.
80
 However, these formal amendment 
procedures do not conclude the story of constitutional amendment in Canada 
because further rigidity features could be imposed by the judiciary.
81
 
 In fact, this hard rigidity found in both the American and Canadian 
Constitutions regarding amendment procedures means that amending them could 
be hard.
82
 However, such strong rigidity should not be understood to mean that 
amending these two Constitutions is impossible but it should be construed to 
mean that they are entirely “entrenched” Constitutions. More precisely, as noted 
earlier, exaggerated supermajorities required for amending a written constitution 
should not be regarded as constitutional entrenchment that shields the 
constitution from amendments. Thus, despite the fact that constitutional rigidity 
could be turned from being a feature that characterize written constitution into 
being a flaw that undermines one of the most democratic rights, which is the 
right to amend the constitution, because of the extravagance with formal 
amendment rules, such rigidity does not live up to configure the constitution to a 
nonamendable text. 
 As much as constitutional entrenchment provisions come to serve 
different purposes, they also take different forms. Many scholarly efforts have 
been exerted in an attempt to classify constitutional unamendability. 
Nevertheless, constitutional law scholars have never reached a conclusive 
agreement regarding the classification of forms of constitutional unamendability. 
Perhaps this is a normal consequence to the broadness of the topic as well as the 
fact that most scholars lack a decisive terminology to classify various forms of 
unamendability.
83
 However, as Richard Albert observed that most of the 
                                                             
80 “An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies 
to one or more, but not all, provinces, including (a) any alteration to boundaries between 
provinces, and (b) any amendment to any provision that relates to the use of the English 
or the French language within a province, may be made by proclamation issued by the 
Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only where so authorized by 
resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of each 
province to which the amendment applies.” Id. at s. 41. 
81 Albert, supra note 74, at 186-187. 
82 See Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, ALTA. L. 
REV. (2015) (arguing that the Constitution of Canada is probably the world’s most 
difficult democratic constitution to be amended by formal constitutional amendment 
procedures.) 
83 Albert, supra note 74, at 188. 
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constitutional entrenchment provisions could be classified in terms of kind and 
degree.
84
 
 In her notable work “Democracy and Legal Change,” Melissa 
Schwartzberg developed an interesting formula for the classification of 
constitutional entrenchment. In her classification, Schwartzberg depended on two 
main criteria: (1) the entrenchment degree of permanence,
85
 and (2) the 
entrenchment subject matter.
86
 Accordingly, Schwartzberg classified 
constitutional entrenchment into temporary and formal.
87
 Schwartzberg went 
further to classify temporary entrenchment into “limited” and “unlimited” 
entrenchment,
88
 and formal entrenchment into “formally specified” or “implicitly 
enforced.”89 According to Schwartzberg, such classification could be subdivided 
into four categories: (1) formal, time-unlimited entrenchment; (2) formal, time-
limited entrenchment; (3) de facto entrenchment; and (4) implicit entrenchment.
90
 
 For Schwartzberg, it is obvious that classifying constitutional 
entrenchment into temporary and then limited and unlimited entrenchment is a 
matter of permanence. However, classifying constitutional entrenchment into 
formal and then de facto and implicit entrenchment concerns the methodology 
adopted to entrench the provision as well as the subject matter of the 
entrenchment. 
 Specifically, an entrenchment could be textually defined in the 
constitutional text without being timely restricted.
91
 Pursuant to Schwartzberg’s 
classification, this entrenchment is called formal, time-unlimited entrenchment. 
The German entrenchment clause, which preserves the federal structure of the 
state, is an example of a formal, time-unlimited entrenchment.
92
 Likewise, the 
Italian and French Constitutions are entrenching the republic form of 
government.
93
 
                                                             
84 Albert, supra note 29, at 670. 
85 MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 8 (2007). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 8-16. 
91 Id. at 8-11; Albert, supra note 74, at 188. 
92 The German Basic Law, supra note 38. 
93 See supra note 44. 
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 Constitutional architects could also design an entrenchment provision 
where it is also textually defined; however, with the intention to last for a 
temporary period of time. This kind of entrenchment is called formal, time-
limited entrenchment in Schwartzberg’s classification. A stark example of this 
kind of entrenchment is Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which entrenched the 
slave trade only until the year 1808.
94
 Similarly, the Constitution of Cape Verde 
includes an entrenchment provision that entrenches the entire Constitution 
against amendments for five years from the date of its ratification.
95
 
 According to Schwartzberg, a de facto entrenchment introduces a 
constitutional provision that is not textually entrenched; yet, is unamendable 
because of the hard standards required for its amendment.
96
 Schwartzberg cited 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which protects the equal suffrage of states in 
the Senate as an example of the de facto entrenchment.
97
 However, as noted 
earlier, such provisions should not be regarded as constitutional entrenchment 
provisions since “high procedural barriers to change”98 should not be construed 
to mean absolute constitutional unamendability. 
 Eventually, implicit entrenchment assumes that a certain principle or 
norm has become so fundamental to such an extent that amending it would 
transform the regime.
99
 Implicit entrenchment could also be deployed to help 
protecting a deeply rooted principle or norm in a given society that its 
amendment is inconceivable.
100
 
 Richard Albert conducted another interesting classification of 
constitutional unamendability.
101
 Unlike Melissa Schwartzberg, whose 
classification mainly depended on the entrenchment degree of permanence with a 
timid reference to the subject matter of the entrenchment, Albert not only cites 
the entrenchment degree of permanence, but also pays a great deal of attention to 
                                                             
94 U.S. CONST., supra note 76; SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 85, at 11. 
95 CAPE VERDE CONST., supra note, 59. 
96 SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 85, at 12. 
97 U.S. CONST., supra note 76; SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 85, at 12. 
98 SCHWARTZBERG,  supra note 85, at 12. 
99 Id. at 13-16; Albert, supra note 74, at 189. 
100 Albert, supra note 74, at 189. 
101 Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67 
S.C.L.R. 181, 189-194 (2014). 
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the subject matter of the entrenchment and the interest the entrenchment aims to 
protect.
102
 
 Albert classifies constitutional unamendability into (1) substantive 
unamendability, (2) procedural unamendability, and (3) temporary 
unamendability.
103
 According to Albert, a constitutional entrenchment provision 
that is substantively unamendable imposes restrictions on the subject matter of 
the protected rule or principle.
104
 Constitutional entrenchments that make 
federalism or republicanism unamendable are substantive unamendable clauses 
since they restrict what can be amended. Procedural unamendability concerns the 
procedures of formal amendment in which the constitutional provision is actually 
entrenched pursuant to the formal amendment rules.
105
 Finally, temporary 
unamendability introduces a constitutional provision that is entrenched only for a 
certain period of time.
106
 
 Albert then classifies each form of unamendability into formal, informal, 
and theoretical unamendable provisions.
107
 According to him, in a formal 
substantive unamendable provision, the subject matter is textually entrenched in 
the constitutional text.
108
 An informal substantive unamendable provision refers 
to a binding judicial decision/interpretation from the highest court.
109
 An example 
of this kind of unamendability is the 2009 decision of the Czech Constitutional 
Court ruling that Constitutional Act no.195/2009, regarding shortening the term 
of the Office of the Chamber of Deputies, was unconstitutional because it was an 
individual and retroactive act, and thus violated the unamendable provision of 
Art. 9(2) entrenching the requirements of a democratic state.
110
 Further, the 
                                                             
102 Id. 
103
 Id. 
104 Id. at 189. 
105 Id. at 191. 
106 Id. at 192. 
107 Id, at 189-194. 
108 Id. at 190. 
109 Id. 
110 Constitutional Act on Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies, 
2009/09/10 - Pl. ÚS 27/09, 
http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=468&cHash=b239af8f32
f409fe77493adf911e665f; see also Kieran Williams, When a Constitutional Amendment 
Violates the Substantive Core: The Czech Constitutional Court’s September 2009 Early 
Elections Decision, 36 REV. CEN. & EAST EUR. L. 33 (2011); Yaniv Roznai, 
Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections Following the 
Czech Constitutional Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8 
VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. LAW (2014). “The substantive requisites of the democratic, law-
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decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the landmark case of Minerva Mills Ltd. 
v. Union of India,
111
 which held that the 42nd Amendment of the Indian 
Constitution was unconstitutional because it violated the basic structure of the 
constitution,
112
 could be constructed as an informal substantive unamendability. 
Finally, theoretical substantive unamendability introduces scholarly 
constitutional theories as a restriction on the ability to limit certain constitutional 
principles or rules.
113
 For example, a wide range of constitutional scholars assert 
that constitutional principles like human dignity, rule of law, separation of 
powers, and fundamental freedoms should not be subject to amendment. 
 Likewise, Albert divided procedural unamendability into formal, 
informal, and theoretical unamendability. Formal procedural unamendability 
introduces a procedural unamendability that is stipulated in the text.
114
 The 
Ukranian Constitution, for example, makes itself unamendable in the event of 
martial law or a state of emergency: “The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be 
amended in conditions of martial law or a state of emergency.”115 Informal 
procedural unamendability is the outcome of unrealistically hard formal 
amendment rules, which make amending the constitutional provision 
inconceivable.
116
 Theoretical procedural unamendability concerns with the 
distinction between constitutional amendment and constitutional revision.
117
 The 
German jurist Carl Schmitt illustrated the difference between constitutional 
amendment and revision arguing that: 
[I]t is not the intent of constitutional arrangements with respect 
to constitutional revisions to introduce a procedure to destroy the 
system of order that should be constituted by the constitution. If 
a constitution foresees the possibility of revisions, these 
revisions do not provide a legal method to destroy the legality of 
the constitution, even less a legitimate means to destroy its 
legitimacy. 
118
 
                                                                                                                                                       
abiding State may not be amended.” Č, ch. 1, art. 9(2), ÚSTAVY ČR [CONST.] (Czech 
Republic). 
111 1980 AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206. 
112 Id. 
113 Albert, supra note 74, at 191. 
114 Id.  
115 UKRAINE CONST., ch. XIII, art. 157 (1996). 
116 Albert, supra note 74, at 191. As explained earlier I reluctantly consider these 
provisions as nonamendable constitutional provisions.  
117 Id. at 192. 
118 CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 58-60 (2004). 
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 Further, according to Schmitt, constitutional amendment is permissible 
“only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution 
as an entirety is preserved.”119 Consequently, constitutional amendment is only 
concerned with “fine-tuning what is already in place.”120 However, constitutional 
revision most likely results in an overall change in the structure of the entire 
constitution, a matter that must be left to the constituent power. Thus, a 
constitutional revision by the constituent power is required to alter some 
constitutional principles that are hard to change with a mere constitutional 
amendment.
121
 
 Finally, Albert noted that all of the previous forms of constitutional 
unamendability could be either temporary or permanent unamendability.
122
 
Specifically, formal substantive unamendability could be temporary as it is in 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution or in Article 309(1) of the Cape Verdean 
Constitution. Formal substantive unamendability could also be permanent, such 
as the entrenchment provisions of the Italian, German, and French 
Constitutions.
123
 
 Likewise, informal substantive and procedural unamendability are 
sometime temporary when a high court decides to set aside its previous precedent 
that a certain constitutional provision is unamendable.
124
 Theoretical 
unamendability may also be temporary since, as Albert argues, constitutional 
scholars could base their theories on temporary or permanent standards.
125
 
 Next, we will use these different classifications to categorize the 
unamendability clause of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014. 
V. EGYPT’S CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT 
 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014 was not the only precedent to 
entrench a constitutional provision among the various Arabian constitutions.
126
 
                                                             
119 Id. at 150. 
120 Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1750-1752 (2005). 
121 Albert, supra note 74, at 192. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 193. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., ALG. CONST., tit. IV, art. 178(3) (1989), BAHR. CONST., ch. VI, art. 120(c) 
(d) (2002), DJIB. CONST., tit. XII, art. 92 (1992), JORDAN CONST., ch. 9, art. 126(2) 
(1952), MAURITANIA CONST., tit. XI, art. 99 (1991), MOROCCO CONST., tit. XIII, art. 175 
(2011), SOMAL. CONST., ch. 15, tit. I, art. 132(1) (2) (2012), TUNIS. CONST., tit(s). 1, 2 & 
4, art(s). (1), (2), (49) & (75) (2014). 
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However, we can assertively say that Egypt’s constitutional entrenchment 
provision is the most interesting, yet puzzling, entrenchment in terms of 
classification and significance. 
 Egypt’s Constitution of 2014 contains an unamendable clause that could 
be found in the text of Article 226, Section 5, which reads as follow: “In all 
cases, texts pertaining to the re-election of President of the Republic or the 
principles of freedom or equality stipulated in this Constitution may not be 
amended, unless the amendment brings more guarantees.”127 
A. Classifying Egypt’s Entrenchment Provision 
 A careful examination of the entrenchment provision of Article 226, 
Section 5 discloses that it fits under many forms of constitutional 
unamendability. Specifically, under Schwartzberg’s classification of 
constitutional unamendability, this entrenchment could be classified as a formal 
unamendable provision since it textually entrenches rules of presidential re-
election and principles of freedom and equality. Additionally, this entrenchment 
could also be regarded as a conditional unamendable provision because the 
permanence of the entrenched rules and principles is conditioned upon whether 
the proposed amendment introduces more guarantees. 
 Considering Albert’s classifications of constitutional unamendability, the 
entrenchment provision of Article 226, Section 5 could be classified as a 
substantive formal unamendability.
128
 It is formal because it textually entrenches 
the protected subject matter in the constitutional text.
129
 It is also substantive 
since it restricts what could be amended: rules of presidential re-election and 
principles of freedom and equality.
130
 
 Judging Article 226, Section 5’s entrenchment provision from the 
perspective of its purpose, I am reluctant to call it a preservative unamendable 
provision because I have no record that the constitutional drafters intended to 
preserve principles of freedom and equality, or rules of presidential reelection. 
However, this entrenchment could be regarded as a transformational 
unamendability. Transformational unamendability is a form of constitutional 
entrenchment that seeks to abandon certain practices or beliefs from the past and 
                                                             
127 EGYPT CONST. art. 226, s.5 (2014) 
128 See supra section IV. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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adopt a new principle or ideology that helps to redefine the state’s constitutional 
identity.
131
 Egypt is still going through the early phases of democratization. After 
the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, which ended thirty years of repression under 
President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, and the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi 
in 2013, which ended the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Egyptians 
found themselves with the serious challenge of drafting a more democratic 
constitution – one that maintains individual rights and freedoms, and a peaceful 
rule-based alternation of power. Consequently, rules governing presidential terms 
and the principles of equality and individual freedoms are deemed important and 
pretentious for post-revolutionary Egypt; thus, they need to be entrenched in the 
constitutional text. 
 Notwithstanding the entrenchment clause found in Section 5 of Article 
226, the Article mainly sets forth rules of constitutional formal amendment. More 
precisely, in the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, Article 226 falls under the General 
& Transitional Provisions, with the first four sections of the Article stating how 
the Constitution could be amended: 
The amendment of one or more articles of the Constitution may 
be requested by the President of the Republic or one-fifth of the 
members of the House of Representatives. The request shall 
specify the articles requested to be amended and the reasons for 
such amendment. 
In all cases, the House of Representatives shall discuss the 
amendment request within 30 days from the date of its receipt. 
The House shall issue its decision to accept the request in whole 
or in party by a majority of its members.
 
 
If the request is rejected, the same articles may not be requested 
to be amended again before the next legislative term.
 
 
If the amendment request is approved by the House, it shall 
discuss the text of the articles requested to be amended within 60 
days from the date of approval. If approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the house’s members, the amendment shall be put to 
a public referendum within 30 days from the date the approval is 
issued. The amendment shall be effective from the date on which 
the referendum’s result and the approval of a valid majority of 
the participants in the referendum are announced.
132
 
 
 The question right now regards the significance of listing the 
entrenchment clause in the same Article that deals with formal amendment rules. 
Apart from my doubt that Egypt’s constitutional drafters intended to do so, 
                                                             
131 Id. 
132 EGYPT CONST., art. 226, §§ 1,2,3 & 4. 
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including an entrenchment clause in the article that prescribes constitutional 
formal amendment rules is no more than a reference that such clause could fall 
under the category of procedural constitutional entrenchments. Reading the five 
sections of Article 226 altogether illustrates that Section 5’s entrenchment is a 
formal procedural unamendable clause — prohibiting formal amendment in 
connection with less guarantees to rules of presidential re-election and principles 
of freedom and equality — which is textually codified in the constitutional text. 
However, classifying Article 226, Section 5 as a procedural unamendability is 
challenged by the fact that the Article does not shield its entrenched principles 
for a specific period of time in which amending these principles within this 
period is prohibited. 
 Nevertheless, the permanence of the entrenchment provision found in 
Article 226, Section 5 is actually limited by a purported amendment that brings 
more guarantees and protection to the entrenched rules and principles. Having 
said that, Article 226, Section 5 could be regarded as a procedural conditioned 
unamendability that prohibits formal amendment unless the proposed amendment 
confers more guarantees. 
B. Purpose of the Entrenchment Provision 
 What did the constitutional drafters in Egypt try to achieve by the 
entrenchment provision? According to Article 226, Section 5, the entrenched-
unamendable norms are rules that govern presidential re-election and principles 
of freedom and equality. Thus, despite the fact that in Egypt’s long constitutional 
history, the position of Islamic Sharia and the form of the state were the most 
often confronted,
133
 unlike the Tunisian Constitution, which shares the same 
circumstances and year of adoption with the Egyptian Constitution, Article 226, 
Section 5 of the Egyptian Constitution chose neither to entrench the state official 
religion, Islam, nor the form of the state.
134
 However, as already mentioned, 
                                                             
133 With a long constitutional history dating to 1882 when it was an Ottoman province, 
Egypt is considered to be the oldest constitutional state in the Arab world. Under the 
monarchy system, Egypt had two constitutions, those of 1923 and 1930. After the 
abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of the republic in 1952, Egypt underwent 
the drafting and application of six constitutions, those of 1956, 1958, 1964, 1971, 2012, 
and 2014. 
134 Article 1 of the Tunisian Constitution reads, “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign 
state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican. This article 
might not be amended.” TUNISIA CONST., tit. 1, art. 1 (2014). 
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Article 226, Section 5 entrenches rules of presidential reelection and principles of 
freedom and equality. 
 However, before proceeding to speculate on why the constitutional 
drafters chose particularly to entrench rules of presidential reelection and 
principles of freedom and equality, I should note that the notion of 
“superconstitutionalism,” a mechanism to provide rigid amendment procedures 
that protects high-valued constitutional principles,
135
 is not an intruder in the 
content of the Egyptian legislation. More specifically, Egypt’s current 
Constitution of 2014 acknowledges the concept of “superstatute” when Article 
121 requires a two-thirds special majority to pass laws deemed complementary to 
the Constitution, laws regulating elections, political parties, the judiciary, judicial 
bodies and organizations, and rights and freedoms.
136
 
 Accordingly, Article 221 regards laws complementary to the 
Constitution as super statutes – high-valued statutes – requiring a two-thirds 
majority vote in the House of Representatives for their issuance and amendment, 
rather than the normal majority vote required for other statutes. Article 226, 
Section 5 also considers rules of presidential reelection and principles of 
freedoms and equality as being super-constitutional norms that need to be 
protected to a degree greater than the baseline prescribed for other rules and 
principles mentioned in the Constitution, and thus shields them from formal 
amendments unless these amendments add more guarantees. 
   Egypt’s approach of entrenching rules governing presidential term is not 
new or unusual. The Constitutions of El-Salvador and Guatemala did it long 
before the Egyptian Constitution.
137
 The Egyptian Constitution’s rules governing 
                                                             
135 Russell Patrick Plato, Selective Entrenchment Against Constitutional Change: Subject 
Matter Restrictions and the Threat of Differential Amendability, NYU L. REV. 1470, 
1473 (2007). 
136 “The Laws deemed complementary to the Constitution shall be issued by a majority of 
two thirds of the House members. Laws regulating presidential or parliamentary or 
municipal elections, political parties, the judiciary, related to judicial bodies and judicial 
organizations, and those regulating the rights and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution 
shall be deemed complementary to the Constitution.” EGYPT CONST., art. 121, § 4. 
137 “Under no circumstances, may the articles of this Constitution, which refer to the form 
and system of government, to the territory of the Republic, and to the principle that a 
President cannot succeed himself, be amended.” EL SAL. CONST., tit. IX, art. 248. “In no 
case may Article 140, 141, 165 paragraph (g), 186, and 187 be reformed, nor may any 
question concerning the republican form of government, [or] to the principle of the non-
reelection for the exercise of the Presidency of the Republic be raised in any form, neither 
may the effectiveness or application of the Articles that provide for alternating the tenure 
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presidential terms are asserted in Article 140, which reads, “The President of the 
Republic shall be elected for a period of four calendar years, commencing from 
the day following the termination of the term of his predecessor. The President 
may only be reelected once.” 
 A careful reading of Article 226, Section 5 reveals that it does not 
entrench the first presidential term, only the second-term. Although we lack 
records from the drafting process on why the constitutional drafters chose to do 
so, perhaps it was a result of the fear common among Egyptians regarding 
presidents remaining in power by bending the constitution, and ignoring their 
promises not to exceed their prescribed term and to handover the presidency. For 
instance, in 1980, President Mohammad Anwar el-Sadat amended Article 77 of 
the 1971 Constitution after feeling constrained by its language, which limited the 
President to two six-year terms.
138
 After the approval of the amendment, the 
phrase “the President may be reelected for other successive terms” was added to 
Article 77.
139
 President Hosni Mubarak likewise used this article to remain in 
power for nearly thirty years. 
 Accordingly, perhaps entrenching the limit of the presidential second-
term was an attempt to provide more curbs on presidents’ ambitions and to 
prevent another dictatorship in Egypt. Further, by entrenching the presidential 
second-term, constitutional drafters might seek to protect the state democratic 
structure from emotional Egyptians who may admire a certain president and urge 
for his continuation beyond the four-year term. 
 On the other hand, Article 226, Section 5 entrenches principles of 
freedom and equality. It seems that entrenching these principles was an attempt 
to distance the new post-revolutionary Egypt from the authoritarian regimes of 
President Mubarak, who ruled the country under emergency law for almost thirty 
years, and the Muslim Brotherhood, who further restricted freedoms and 
infringed on human rights.  
                                                                                                                                                       
of the Presidency of the Republic be suspended or their content be changed or modified 
in any other way.” GUAT. CONST., tit. VII, art. 281 (1985). 
138 Mohamed Abdelaal, Religious Constitutionalism in Egypt, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF. 35, 36 (2013). 
139 Id. 
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 The Constitution of 2014 acknowledges human dignity,
140
 individual 
freedom,
141
 the sanctity of private life,
142
 freedom of movement,
143
 freedom of 
belief,
144
 freedom of expression,
145
 freedom of press,
146
 and right to assemble
147
 
and participate in political life.
148
 Accordingly, entrenching such freedoms and 
rights could be construed as compensation for violations and infringements 
suffered by Egyptians during the last two toppled regimes. It also means a 
reassurance to Egyptians that their democratic rights and freedoms would be 
constitutionally guaranteed. 
 Likewise, the approach of Article 226, Section 5 in entrenching principle 
of equality is another attempt to ensure the distinction of Egypt from past 
practices and its transformation towards a more democratic republic. In fact, the 
importance of entrenching the principle of equality is manifested in examining its 
development in Egypt’s former two Constitutions – 1971 and 2012. For instance, 
Article 33 of the 2012 Constitution read, “[a]ll citizens are equal before the law. 
They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination.” Article 33 
omitted the phrase “without discrimination between them [the citizens] due to 
sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed” found in Article 40 of the 1971 
                                                             
140 EGYPT CONST., art. 51 (2014). 
141 Id, at art(s). 54 & 55. 
142 Id. at art. 57. 
143 Id. at art. 62. 
144 Id., at art. 64. In fact, a provision that could be seen as curtailing freedom of belief is 
Article 3 of the Egyptian Constitution, which reads, “[t]he canon principles of Egyptian 
Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, 
religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders.” One could argue that this 
article restricts freedom of belief since it acknowledges only Christianity and Judaism as 
religions beside Islam, to be the main source of legislation in matters related to their 
believers’ personal status law, and thus ignoring other faiths in Egypt. Consequently, 
those who do not believe in Christianity or Judaism are not allowed to be judged 
according to the canon rules of their faiths in matters related to their personal affairs and 
would be subject to Islamic law. Indeed, I regard acknowledging only Christianity and 
Judaism as divine religions to be recognized beside Islam is a matter of “state’s 
ideology,” which has nothing to do with restricting freedom of belief since such freedom 
is absolutely guaranteed by virtue of Article 64, which states “freedom of belief is 
absolute.” See Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Constitution: What went Wrong?, 7 VIENNA 
J. INT’L CONST. L. 200, 207-208 (2013). 
145 EGYPT CONST., art. 65. 
146 Id. at art. 70. 
147 Id. at art. 73. 
148 Id. at art. 74. 
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Constitution.
149
 Thus, a careful reading to Article 33 of the 2012 Constitution, 
which was drafted during the Muslim Brotherhood regime, reveals that it does 
not fully guarantee equality between citizens, allowing discrimination between 
them based on different grounds such as, sex, religion, or ethnic origin.
150
 
 Consequently, in an attempt to remedy this anomaly, Article 53 of the 
2014 Constitution, which amended the 2012 Constitution, emphasized the 
principle of equality between all citizens and restored the phrase from Article 33 
of the 1971 Constitution – “without discrimination between them [the citizens] 
due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.” Article 53 also prohibits 
discrimination based on some new grounds, such as “disability, social class, 
political or geographic affiliation.” Further, to confer more protection and avoid 
any attempt to sabotage its content, as mentioned earlier, Article 226, Section 5 
of the 2014 Constitution entrenched the principle of equality. 
C. Egypt’s Entrenchment Provision: A Puzzled Language 
 As mentioned above, the last portion of Article 226, Section 5, which 
reads, “unless the amendment brings more guarantees,” serves as a limitation on 
the permanency of the unamendable clause. Accordingly, unlike in Article V of 
the U.S. Constitution, the unamendable clause in Article 226, Section 5 of the 
Egyptian Constitution is substantively limited rather than time-limited. 
 Most constitutions that choose to limit the applicability of their 
unamendable provisions will do so using a prescribed period of time, after which 
the entrenchment expires. However, some constitutions adopt the same approach 
introduced by the Egyptian Constitution in limiting the applicability of their 
entrenchment provisions on substantive grounds rather than rendering its 
expiration dependent on the lapse of a defined period of time. 
 For instance, Article X of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Constitution 
reads, “No amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the 
rights and freedoms referred to in Article II of this Constitution or alter the 
present paragraph.”151 Article 131 of the Namibian Constitution likewise states,  
                                                             
149 Article 40 of the 1971 Constitution reads, “[t]hey [the citizens] have equal rights and 
duties without discrimination between them due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion 
or creed.” 
150 Perhaps this approach was driven by Egypt’s Islamists’ strict ideology that women and 
non-Muslims not be eligible to run for the office of the president. See Abdelaal, supra 
note 144, at 209-210. 
151 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONST., art. X(2) (1995). 
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No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3 
hereof, in so far as such repeal or amendment diminishes or 
detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms contained and 
defined in the Chapter, shall be permissible under this 
Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall 
be valid or have any force or effect.
152
  
 
Similarly, Article 157 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides, “The Constitution 
of Ukraine shall not be amended, if the amendments foresee the abolition or 
restriction of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms…”153 
 A careful examination of these three constitutional articles reveals that 
the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Namibia, and Ukraine could be 
changed by formal amendment if such amendments improve the rights and 
freedoms prescribed in the constitutional text. By including Article 226, Section 
5 of the Egyptian Constitution, which allows formal amendment as long as it 
provides more guarantees to rules of presidential re-election and principles of 
freedom and equality, we can conclude that the four articles do not absolutely 
shield the entrenched principles from formal amendment. More precisely, the 
four articles are not decisively unamendable provisions since they allow formal 
amendment that confers more protection to the entrenched principles and rules. 
 However, the content of Article 226, Section 5 of the Egyptian 
Constitution is different from the unrestricted unamendable natures of the 
entrenchment clauses found in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian, the Namibian, 
and the Ukrainian Constitutions in that it begs the question, what if the purported 
amendment grants more guarantees to the entrenched principles? Perhaps it is the 
explicit language of Article 226, Section 5, “unless the amendment brings more 
guarantees,” which none of the comparable mentioned constitutional articles use, 
that urges us not to consider the article as a fully entrenchment provision. Indeed, 
one can argue that regardless of whether a constitution explicitly or implicitly 
makes its entrenchment clause unequivocally unamendable, the outcome is the 
same: there is still a room for formal amendment rules to change the entrenched 
principles. Such an argument is not without merit; nevertheless, the explicit 
language of Article 226, Section 5 is a drafting defect by Egypt’s constitutional 
drafters that is likely to generate tough constitutional dilemmas. 
                                                             
152 NAMIBIA CONST., ch. 19, art. 131 (1990). 
153 UKRAINE CONST., ch. XIII, art 157 (1996). 
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 As confusing as it might be, perhaps the language of Article 226, Section 
5 helps loosen the illegitimate tang of constitutional entrenchments because after 
all, these proposed amendments, alleged to confer more guarantees on the 
entrenched principles, would be subject to the approval of the general public in a 
popular referendum. Two questions arise: what amendment brings more 
guarantees, and who determines whether the amendment brings more guarantees? 
The answers to these questions highlight the paradox of Egypt’s constitutional 
entrenchment created by the too-explicit language of Article 226, Section 5. 
 As mentioned before, Article 140 of the Constitution limits the president 
to a presidency term of four calendar years with the possibility of one reelection. 
Article 226, Section 5 obviously entrenches the four-year reelection term, not the 
original first term. By setting the entrenched four-year reelection term to the 
standard of amendability provided by Article 226, Section 5, the amendment 
brings more guarantees, and prompts the question: how could an amendment 
confer more guarantees to the presidency reelection term?  
 A constitutional amendment that limits the four-year reelection term 
could be considered a guarantee against tyranny and dictatorship. Alternatively, a 
constitutional amendment that extends the presidential reelection term beyond 
the prescribed four years, or even opens it for indefinite period of time, could 
provide more guarantees for popular president, in war, or in unstable times. 
 A paradoxical situation could be raised considering what amendment 
brings more guarantees to the entrenched principle of equality. For instance, 
despite the fact that Egypt’s current Constitution of 2014 declares all citizens 
equal before the law, acknowledging the same rights and duties to all of them,
154
 
it favors some categories, such as workers, farmers,
155
 youths, Christians, 
disabled individuals, and migrants, thus the Egyptian State must seek their 
                                                             
154 “Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public duties, and may not 
be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, 
disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any other reason. 
Discrimination and incitement to hate are crimes punishable by law. The state shall take 
all necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law shall regulate 
the establishment of an independent commission for this purpose.” Id. at art. 53. 
155 “The state grants workers and farmers appropriate representation in the first House of 
Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is adopted, in the manner specified 
by law.” Id. at art. 243. 
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appropriate representation in the first House of Representatives.
156
 Further, the 
Constitution requires workers and farmers to be represented in local councils by 
no less than 50 percent.
157
 
 One could claim that a constitutional amendment that abolishes this kind 
of preferential treatment would certainly introduce more guarantees to the 
principle of equality. However, there is an argument that Egyptian Christians, 
youths, and disabled people are likely not to be represented in the parliament 
without the intervention of the State to guarantee such representation and thus, a 
constitutional amendment that heightens this preferential treatment should be 
consider as bringing more guarantees to the entrenched principle of equality. 
 Similarly, preferential treatment in favor of women is also evident in the 
Constitution. For example, after directing the State to achieve equality between 
women and men in politics,
158
 the Constitution commands the State to guarantee 
an appropriate representation of women in the Houses of Representatives.
159
 
 The same questions and arguments raised above apply here. Particularly, 
should a constitutional amendment that abolishes the State’s guarantee of 
women’s parliamentary representation be regarded as a guarantee in favor of the 
principle of equality, or should a constitutional amendment that empowers the 
State with further mechanisms to ensure women’s representation in the 
parliament brings guarantees to the principle of equality, given Egyptian women 
status of being politically sidelined. 
 The second question regarding who declares whether the purported 
amendment confers more guarantees on the entrenched principles is in fact a 
question of who has the authority to interpret the constitutional amendment. 
                                                             
156
 “The state grants youth, Christians, persons with disability and expatriate Egyptians 
appropriate representation in the first House of Representatives to be elected after this 
Constitution is adopted, in the manner specified by law.” Id. at art. 244. 
157 “Every local unit elects a local council by direct, secret ballot for a term of four years. 
A candidate must be no younger than 21 years old. The law regulates other conditions for 
candidacy and procedures of election, provided that one quarter of the seats are allocated 
to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women, workers and farmers are 
represented by no less than 50 percent of the total number of seats, and these percentages 
include a proper representation of Christians and people with disability.” Id. at art 180. 
158 “The state commits to achieving equality between women and men in all civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution.” Id. at art. 11. 
159 “The state commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate 
representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified by law. It 
grants women the right to hold public posts and high management posts in the state, and 
to appointment in judicial bodies and entities without discrimination.” Id. 
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Usually the constitutional or supreme court of a given country reserves to that 
authority. However, this is not always the case; some countries’ constitutions 
assign the legislature this task.
160
 In the Egyptian system, all courts are allowed to 
interpret the constitution and thus constitutional amendments. Yet more than any 
other court, the Supreme Constitutional Court is likely to interpret the 
constitution pursuant to its power of judicial review. 
D. Amending the Constitutional Entrenchment 
 Given that the entrenched principles of Article 226, Section 5 are not 
fully shielded against formal amendments, can the entire entrenchment clause of 
Article 226, Section 5 be amended? 
 This question raises the dilemma of a non-self-entrenched provision, 
which introduces a situation where the constitutional provision entrenches certain 
super constitutional principles without being itself entrenched against 
amendment. Unlike the entrenchment provisions of the Nigerian
161
 and the 
Tunisian Constitutions,
162
 most of the world’s constitutions adopt non self-
entrenched provisions. 
 Before addressing the question of whether the non-self-entrenched 
provision of Article 226, Section 5 could be amended, I want to pause at some 
scholars’ distinctions between amending and repealing the entrenchment 
provision.
163
 There is no doubt that an amendment to repeal the entrenchment 
provision would result in a constitutional violation if the entrenchment provision 
                                                             
160 For example, consider Article 121 of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 which 
authorizes the legislature, the Storting, to determine whether to accept or refuse a 
proposed constitutional amendment. 
161 After entrenching the form of the State, the multiparty system, and the principle of 
separation of State and religion, Article 175 of the Nigerian Constitution entrenched itself 
against amendment. “No procedure of revision may be engaged or followed when the 
integrity of the territory is infringed. The republican form of the State, the multiparty 
system, the principle of the separation of State and religion and the provisions of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 47 and of Article 185 of this Constitution may not be made 
the object of any revision. No procedure of revision of this Article is receivable.” NIGER 
CONST., tit. XII, art. 175 (2010). 
162 Besides entrenching the sovereignty of the State and its form, the official religion and 
language, the principle of supremacy of law and the will of the people, Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Tunisian Constitution entrenched themselves from being amendment. “Tunisia is a 
free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its 
system is republican. This article might not be amended.”; “Tunisia is a civil state based 
on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law. This article might not be 
amended.” TUNISIA CONST., tit. 1, arts. 1 & 2.  
163 See e.g., Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Logic, Law, 
Omnipotence, and Change § 9 (1990). 
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forbids both the amendment of the entrenched principles and rules as well as the 
repeal of itself.
164
 
 Repealing a self-entrenched unamendable provision should only be done 
by constituent power through an act or revolution; nevertheless, an attempt to 
argue that amending the unamendable entrenchment provision is something 
different from entirely repealing it. Such an argument is unlikely to generate any 
productive argument since the power to repeal to implicitly include the power to 
amend. As Douglas Linder rightly argues, “only a hide-bound formalist would 
contend that the difference [between one and two amendments] is significant.”165 
 Now back to the main question: can a non-self-entrenchment provision 
be amended or entirely repealed? A practical approach would answer this 
question affirmatively. Consider, for instance, the entrenchment provision of the 
Portuguese Constitution of 1976 (Article 288) that was amended in 1989 to omit 
several economic restrictions, including the entrenched principle of collective 
ownership,
166
 in a process described to undermine “the standard meaning” and 
the enforceability of the Constitution.
167
 
 However, states have developed mechanisms to triumph over problems 
created by a non-self-entrenchment provision rendering it unamendable, 
                                                             
164 Id. 
165 Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 
717, 729 (1981). 
166 Yaniv Roznai, Amending ‘Unamendable’ Provisions, CONSTITUTION MAKING & 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-
provisions/. Article 288 of the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 includes a long list of 
principles that are shielded against amendments. According to the article the amending 
power must respect: (a) National independence and the unity of the State; (b) The 
republican form of government; (c) The separation of the Churches from the State; (d) 
The rights, freedoms, and safeguards of the citizens; (e) The rights of the workers, 
workers' committees, and trade unions; (f) The co-existence of the public, the private, and 
the cooperative and social sectors, with respect to the property of the means of 
production; (g) The existence of economic plans within the framework of a mixed 
economy; (h) Universal, direct, secret, and periodical suffrage for the appointment of the 
elected members of the organs of supreme authority, the autonomous regions, and the 
organs of local government, as well as the system of proportional representation; (i) 
Plurality of expression and political organization, including political parties and the right 
to a democratic opposition; (j) Separation and interdependence of the organs of supreme 
authority; (l) The scrutiny of legal provisions for active unconstitutionality and 
unconstitutionality by omission; (m) The independence of the courts; (n) The autonomy 
of local authorities; (o) The political and administrative autonomy of the archipelagos of 
the Azores and Madeira. 
167 Paulo Ferreira Da Cunha, Constitutional Sociology and Politics: Theories and 
Memories, 5 SILESIAN J. LEGAL STUD. 11, 25 (2013). 
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notwithstanding its language, which suggests the amendment possibility. These 
mechanisms can be classified into theoretical and judicial mechanisms. 
1. Theoretical Unamendability (Fraude à la constitution) 
 According to the French theorist Georges Liet-Veaux, any attempt to 
amend the constitutional entrenchment provision, including the strategy adopted 
by the political actors in amending it, is considered a “fraude à la constitution,”168 
i.e., “fraud upon the constitution.”169 However, before proceeding further, I 
should note that I am not concerned with the “political barriers” that might render 
the amendment of the entrenchment provision practically inconceivable despite 
being formally amendable pursuant to its plain language. 
 For Liet-Veaux, “fraude à la constitution” happens when the language of 
the text is respected while the spirit of the institution is undermined.
170
 Thus, 
constitutional architects commit fraud against the constitution when they strictly 
adhere to the text of the provision that permits amendments while ignoring its 
content that logically prohibits such amendments.
171
 Georges Burdeau rightly 
argues that the amendment/revision process should neither hijack the power of 
the revised text nor ruin the foundation of its existing political system.
172
 
 It is worthwhile to mention that since a fraud against the constitution is 
achieved when the plain language of the constitutional entrenchment provision is 
interpreted with great formality so as to justify an outcome that is apparently 
inconsistent with the purpose of the entrenchment;
173
 such fraud is not linked 
with certain circumstances or a particular period. That is, it may occur in either 
permanent or transitional constitutions.
174
 Further, it can be committed to subvert 
either a transformational entrenchment that helps transform the state to a more 
                                                             
168 Georges Liet-Veaux, La ‘fraude à la constitution’: Essai d’une analyse juridique des 
révolutions communautaires récentes: Italie, Allemagne, France, 59 REVUE DU DROIT ET 
DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET À L’ÉTRANGER 116, 145 (1943). 
169 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: 
SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 153 (1992); Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 
AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 734 (2011). 
170 Liet-Veaux, supra note 168. 
171 Id.; Albert, supra note 74, at 209. 
172 “l’organe révisionnist ne saurai sans commettre un détournement de pouvoir, ruiner 
les bases foundamentales du système politique auquel est liée son existence.” GEORGES 
BURDEAU, TRAITÉ DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 238 (Tome IV, 1952). 
173 Albert, supra note 74, at 209. 
174 Id. 
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democratic rule, or a preservative entrenchment that preserves a high-valued 
constitutional principle in an already democratic state. 
2. Constitutional Fraud in Egypt 
 The non-self-entrenched provision of Article 226, Section 5 is indeed 
amendable as a sort of constitutional fraud by using the formal amendment rules. 
To illustrate how a constitutional fraud may happen, consider the hypothesis that 
formal amendment rules have been triggered to amend rules of a presidential re-
election term. That is, the President or one-fifth of the members of the House of 
Representatives propose a constitutional amendment to omit the four-year 
presidential re-election term, thus rendering the president eligible to be reelected 
to indefinite periods of time. Pursuant to Article 266, Section 5, the proposed 
amendment would have to confer more guarantees on the rules of presidential re-
election. Now, imagine that the House of Representative failed to reach a 
majority vote to put the amendment into discussion, or failed to reach the two-
thirds majority vote required to pass the amendment under the pretext that the 
purported amendment undermines the guarantees intended to be achieved by the 
four-years presidential re-election rule. Here, Article 226, Section 5 would have 
reached its purpose by protecting the rule of presidential re-election by 
effectively entrenching it against formal amendment. 
 However, as mentioned earlier, Article 266, Section 5 is not self-
entrenched, which means that it is not shielded against formal amendment. 
Accordingly, in an attempt to circumvent its utmost purpose, interest groups and 
political actors could limit the significance and the scope of the entrenched 
principles of Article 226, Section 5 by deploying formal amendment rules to 
amend or abolish Article 226, Section 5 itself. This could be done by a double 
amendment procedure whereby the entrenchment provision is to be repealed by a 
constitutional amendment firstly, and, as a second step, the entrenched principles 
are to be amended since they are no longer protected from formal amendment. 
 In fact, the two-step double amendment procedure is legal since it does 
not constitute a constitutional violation.
175
 Nevertheless, the double amendment 
                                                             
175 In illustrating the stakes of using the double amendment procedure to amend Article V 
of the United States Constitution, Akhil Amar admits that the procedure “would have 
satisfied the literal text of Article V.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 293 (2005). 
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procedure remains illegitimate.
176
 Even though the double amendment procedure 
appears to be consistent with the constitutional text, it subverts the constitution 
by circumventing the prescribed limits to ignore the constitutional purposes. It is 
true that deploying formal amendment rules to repeal Article 226, Section 5 of 
the Egyptian Constitution seems consistent with the language of the article itself; 
however, such approach hides a wicked intent to use the non-self-entrenchment 
to bypass the protection conferred to some of the high-valued constitutional 
principles. The double amendment procedure, therefore, constitutes a 
constitutional fraud. 
3. Judicial Unamendability 
 A non-self-entrenched provision could also be protected judicially 
through the ability of constitutional courts to perform their power to review the 
constitutionality of constitutional amendments and acts. At the outset, the idea of 
reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments or acts seems 
absurd since they possess the same power as the constitution itself; however, the 
number of constitutional courts that have engaged in reviewing proposed 
constitutional amendments and acts negates any doubt regarding this kind of 
judicial review. 
 Comparative judicial precedents show that constitutional courts have 
actually invalidated constitutional amendments and acts either on procedural or 
substantive grounds. A constitutional court may procedurally invalidate a 
constitutional amendment if it fails to meet the requirements and standards 
prescribed in the formal amendment rule laid down in the constitutional text, or if 
it fails to reach the prescribed majority required to pass it.
177
 On the other hand, a 
constitutional court may hold a constitutional amendment substantively 
unconstitutional if it is inconsistent with the content, meaning, or purpose of the 
constitutional text.
178
 
 The United States Supreme Court has reviewed whether amendments are 
procedurally consistent with the Constitution. In 1939, for example, in a 
challenge concerning the constitutionality of Kansas's ratification process of the 
                                                             
176 Albert, supra note 74, at 210. 
177 Albert, supra note 55, at 22. 
178 Id. at 19. 
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Child Labor Amendment,
179
 the Court addressed the discrepant length of time 
between the proposal and ratification to determine whether the Child Labor 
Amendment was ratified according to rules laid out by Article V of the U.S. 
Constitution.
180
 The Court declared that it was not its task to consider this matter 
and concluded that because there was no established deadline regarding when 
state legislatures must act to ratify the constitutional amendment, solely Congress 
could preside over the issue.
181
 
 On the other hand, constitutional courts have also engaged in 
invalidating constitutional amendments and acts on substantive grounds for being 
inconsistent with the content, the meaning, or the purpose of the Constitution. 
For instance, in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, the Indian Supreme Court decided 
that a constitutional amendment that violates the fundamental rights granted in 
the Constitution should be held unconstitutional.
182
 In rendering its decision, the 
Court claimed that a constitutional amendment is a “law” within the meaning of 
Article 13 of the Constitution, and should be voided if it undermined 
fundamental rights.
183
 Six years later, the Golaknath decision was overruled in 
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.
184
 In Kesavananda, the Indian Supreme 
Court declared the Golaknath ruling wrong and held that a constitutional 
                                                             
179 The Child Labor Amendment, which authorizes Congress “to limit, regulate, and 
prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age,” was proposed in 1924 and is a 
still-pending amendment to the United States Constitution. The amendment failed to 
reach the three-fourths majority of the states required to ratify constitutional amendments. 
See Grace Abbott, The Child Labor Amendment-I, 220 THE NORTH AM REV 223, 223 
(1924). 
180 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939). 
181 Id. at 452. The Turkish Constitutional Court has also nullified constitutional 
amendments on procedural grounds. In 1970, the Court invalidated a constitutional 
amendment, which omits the requirement that a convicted person with certain offenses 
must be pardoned first before being eligible to run for the parliamentary election −the 
pardon requirement was included in the Turkish Constitution of 1961− for its failure in 
reaching the required majority in the legislature. Turkish Constitutional Court, June 16, 
1970, Case No. 1970/31, 8 AMKD 313 (1970). For more information regarding the 
position of the Turkish Constitutional Court in reviewing constitutional amendments, see 
Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV 321, 322-
325 (2011). 
182 GolakNath v. Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643. 
183 To reach such decision, the Indian Court cited Article 13 of the 1964 Constitution, 
which reads, “The state shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights 
conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the 
extent of the contravention, be void.” The Court then argued that the word “law” in the 
article applies on amendments to the constitution, since a constitutional amendment is 
after all a type of law. Id. 
184 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973 AIR 1461 (India). 
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amendment was not a law within the particular meaning of Article 13 of the 
Constitution; however, a constitutional amendment must be nullified if it violated 
the basic structure of the Constitution.
185
 After the Kesavananda ruling, the 
“basic structure doctrine” was used by the Indian Court in several cases to strike 
down constitutional amendments that violated the substance of the 
constitution.
186
 
 Similarly, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic asserted their 
authority to review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments and acts to 
determine whether they were substantively in conflict with the constitution. In 
2009, for instance, the Czech Constitutional Court declared the Constitutional 
Act No. 195/2009 Coll., which shortens the term of the Chamber of Deputies, 
unconstitutional for being in direct conflict with “the essential requirements for a 
democratic state” entrenched in Article 9(2) of the 1992 Czech Constitution.187 
 The practice of invalidating constitutional amendments is also evident in 
the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court. In invalidating the Constitutional 
Amendment February 17, 1993, the Supreme Court argued, “[a] constitutional 
amendment, which is emanated from a derived constituent, when violative of the 
original Constitution, may be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 
which is the guardian of the Constitution.”188 
 In Austria, the Constitutional Court also gave itself the authority to 
declare constitutional amendments void if they violate the Constitution. In 2001, 
the Court nullified a provision of a constitutional law, which declared  statutes of 
the Länder, regarding the organization of  the jurisdiction of the organs 
established to review the awards of public contracts, constitutional, on the 
                                                             
185 The Court held that “the power to amend the Constitution does not include the power 
to alter the basic structure, or framework of the Constitution so as to change its identity.” 
Id. at 1260. 
186 See, e.g., Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 AIR 2299 (India); Minerva Mills 
Ltd. v. India, 1980 AIR 1789 (India). For more information about unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments and the basic structure doctrine in India, see SUDHIR 
KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE 
BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE, 44 L. & POL. IN AFR., ASIA & LATIN AM. 273, 273–276 
(2011). 
187 See supra note 110. 
188 ADIN 939-7 DF. Luciano Maia, The Creation and Amendment Process in the 
Brazilian Constitution, in MADS ANDENAS ED. THE CREATION AND THE AMENDMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 54, 9 (2000). 
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grounds that it conflicted with the principles of the rule of law for depriving the 
Constitution’s from its normative power.189 
 It should be noted that most of these constitutional courts have granted 
themselves the authority to review the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments without being disputed by either the executive or the legislature, and 
without waiting for their constitutions to ward them such authority. However, 
constitutions of certain states have explicitly granted constitutional courts the 
power of judicially reviewing constitutional amendments. For example, Article 
146(a) of the Romanian Constitution of 1991, per the 2003 revised version, 
authorizes the constitutional court to adjudicate on initiative to revise the 
constitution.
190
 Likewise, Article 148(1) of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 
empowers the Turkish Constitutional Court the power to test the constitutionality 
of constitutional amendments.
191
 
E. The Power of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in 
Reviewing Constitutional Amendments 
 Having established that Article 226, Section 5 of the 2014 Egyptian 
Constitution is a non-self-entrenched provision that entrenches some high-valued 
constitutional norms, rules of presidential reelection, and principles of equality 
and freedom, a competent body is needed to set the boundaries between 
constitutional and unconstitutional amendments that may undermine the norms 
entrenched therein. The Egyptian legislature might be such a competent body; 
however, like in most democracies, the power of judicial review in Egypt has 
                                                             
189 The Court held that “all legislation of the Länder on the organization and jurisdiction 
of institutions in the field of public procurement review exempt from the Federal 
Constitution. Thus the Constitution should be deprived or its normative power for this 
part of the legal order.” KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38-39 (2008). 
190 “The Constitutional Court has the following functions: (a) to pronounce on the 
constitutionality of laws before their promulgation upon request of the President of 
Romania, one of the presidents of the two Chambers, the Government, the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice, the People’s Attorney, at least 50 deputies or 25 senators, as well 
as on its own initiative [ex officio] on proposals for the amendment of the Constitution.” 
CONSTITUŢIA ROMÂNIEI, tit. V, art. 146(a) (Romania). 
191 “The Constitutional Court shall examine the constitutionality in respect of both form 
and substance of laws, decrees having force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. Constitutional amendments shall be examined and 
verified only with regard to their form. However, no action shall be brought before the 
Constitutional Court alleging the unconstitutionality as to the form or substance of 
decrees having force of law, issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of 
war.” TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONST.] part III, art. 148(1) (Turkey). 
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always been delegated to the highest court, the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
Accordingly, the question is how Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court defines 
its position towards reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. 
 The Constitution of 2014 determines the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court as follows:  
(1) decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations; (2) 
interpret legislative texts; and (3) adjudicate disputes regarding 
affairs of its members, disputes pertaining to the implementation 
of its rulings and decisions, disputes between judicial bodies and 
entities with judicial mandate and disputes that raise 
implementation of two final contradictory rulings.
192
 
 
Further, Law No. 48/1979, regarding the establishment of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court and the determination of its procedures and jurisdiction, 
summarizes the Court’s jurisdiction to be reviewing the constitutionality of laws 
and regulations, interpreting legislative bills, and interpreting laws and 
presidential decrees that have the authority of law.
193
 To a great extent, the 
concept of reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments is urged 
by the idea of proactive judicial review, whereby a constitutional court is 
authorized to proactively examine the constitutionality of laws and amendments 
before they come into effect.
194
 By contrast, the Constitution of 2014 and Law 
No. 48/1979 acknowledge the idea of subsequent judicial review; that is, the 
authority of the Court to test the constitutionality of laws and regulations after 
their issuance and in regard to an ongoing judicial case where a constitutional 
challenge is raised.
195
 
 Moreover, when addressing the Court’s jurisdiction, neither the 
Constitution nor Law No. 48/1979 mentions the authority of the Court to review 
                                                             
192 EGYPT CONST., art. 192. 
193 “The Supreme Constitutional Court solely has the power to: (1) determine the 
constitutionality of the laws and regulations; (2) decide on the disputes over the 
competent authority among the judicial bodies or authorities of judicial competence and; 
(3) decide on the disputes that might take place as to carrying out two final contradictory 
rulings where one of the aforementioned rulings has been issued by one of the judicial 
body and the other by another body of judicial competence.” “The Supreme 
Constitutional Court alone has the power to interpret the laws issued by the Legislative 
Authority and the decrees issued by the Head of the State in case of any divergence as 
regards their implementation.” Law No. 48/1979, Al-Jarida Al-Rismiyyah, arts 25 & 26. 
194 Mohamed Abdelaal, Constitutionality of Constitution Acts in Egypt: Can The 
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court Extend its Jurisdiction?, JURIST ACAD., Oct. 9, 
2014, http://jurist.org/academic/2014/10/mohamed-abdelaal-egyptian-court.php 
195 Id. 
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the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. Thus, unlike in Romania and 
Turkey, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has never been granted such 
authority by virtue of the constitutional text. 
 The last possibility is to consider whether like the Czech, Brazilian, and 
Indiana Constitutional Courts, the Egyptian Constitutional Court has granted 
itself the power to review the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment so 
as to protect the non-self-entrenched provision of Article 226, Section 5 making 
it an informal entrenchment. 
 In a recent decision, in 2007, the Court held that: 
Since the Constitution is the manifestation of the popular will 
along the regional reach of the State, its provisions top the lower 
ranked legal rules. These legal rules, whether promulgated by the 
legislature or the executive according to the constitutional limits, 
must respect the constitutional provisions and be consistent with 
them. Subsequently, it was logical for the legislature as well as 
the constitutional legislator to limit the authority of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court regarding reviewing the constitutional 
legitimacy on the legislative texts only. And, therefore, 
subjecting the Constitution to the Court’s censorship power 
oversteps the prescribed limits of the Court’s mandate.196 
 
Although the Court does not explicitly express its refusal to exercise its power of 
judicial review over constitutional amendments, such a refusal is implicit in the 
Court’s refrain from reviewing the Constitution itself, since constitutional 
amendments are constitutional texts, after all. A careful examination of this 
ruling reveals that the Court based its decision – that reviewing the Constitution 
is beyond its mandate – on the principle of constitutional supremacy. In reaching 
its decision, the Court cited the fact that the constitutional provisions are superior 
to other legal rules made either by the legislature or by the executive, and that 
these rules must be consistent with the constitutional provisions. Thus, the Court 
argued, these legal rules, not the Constitution, are the appropriate field for the 
Court to practice its power of judicial review. 
 I disagree with this ruling not only because the Court denied itself the 
right to subject constitutional amendments to the power of judicial, but also 
because it rested its decision on a blatantly unpalatable reason – constitutional 
supremacy. Constitutional supremacy is more likely to be protected by subjecting 
                                                             
196 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no. 76, Judicial Year 29 (Oct. 1, 2007),  
http://hccourt.gov.eg/Pages/Rules/Rules_Search.aspx#rule_text_1 
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constitutional amendments to the Court’s review test to make sure that they are 
not in conflict with the Constitution’s basic structure or high-valued principles. 
 Interestingly, the Honduran Constitution of 1982 contained an 
unamendable provision that prohibits presidential reelection
197
 before being 
declared inapplicable by the Constitutional Chamber of the Honduran Supreme 
Court in 2015.
198
 Despite the apparent difference between the unamendable 
provision of the Honduran Constitution and the Egyptian Constitution in that the 
former bans presidential reelection while the latter shields the prescribed 
presidential reelection term against future amendments, the Honduran Supreme 
Court, unlike the Egyptian Constitutional Court, satisfied itself with the power of 
reviewing the constitutional texts and thus power of interpreting the constitution, 
including the unamendable provision.  
 The dilemma of reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments and acts in Egypt was evident in 2012 when the now-ousted 
President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood issued the unilateral 2012 
Constitutional Declaration on November 22, 2012. The Declaration, which 
immunized the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the 2012 
constitution and prevented it from being dissolved by the judiciary and or 
challenged in court,
199
 also immunized most of the presidential decrees and 
ordinances
200
 and dismissed the prosecutor general, in violation to the Judiciary 
Act,
201
 resulting in a huge disagreement between the judiciary and the 
                                                             
197 “The foregoing article, this article, the Articles of the Constitution relating to the form 
of government, national territory, the presidential term, the prohibition from reelection to 
the presidency of the republic, the citizen who has served as president under any title, and 
to persons who may not be president of the republic for the subsequent period may not be 
amended.” HONDURAS CONST., art. 374 (1982). 
198 Corte Suprema de Justicia – Sala de Lo Constitucional Tegucigalpa, Municipio del 
Distrito Central, veintidos de abril de dos mil quince [Supreme Court –Constitutional 
Chamber Tegucigalpa, Central District, 22 April of 2014],  
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/Documents/FalloSCONS23042015.pdf.  
199 “No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the 
Constituent Assembly.” CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF 2012, art. V (Egypt). 
200 “The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and 
the goals of the revolution.” Id. at art. VI. 
201 “The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the judiciary 
by the President of the Republic for a period of four years commencing from the date of 
office and is subject to the general conditions of being appointed as a judge and should 
not be under the age of 40. This provision applies to the one currently holding the 
position with immediate effect.” Id. at art. III. 
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president.
202
 Such a disagreement was the result of the Declaration’s direct 
conflict with the 2011 Constitutional Declaration issued by the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and approved in a popular referendum after the 
Revolution of 2011 to serve as the country's fundamental law until the drafting of 
a new constitution, besides its authoritarian rules. 
 In fact, the way the Supreme Constitutional Court responded to the 
Declaration reflected its position established in the previously mentioned ruling 
towards reviewing constitutional amendments and acts. Specifically, the Court’s 
reaction did not go beyond denouncing the Declaration, arguing that it was no 
more than an attempt from President Morsi to unconstitutionally seize more 
powers and to degrade the judiciary without taking any further step towards 
judicial action. The Court’s reaction was to some extent expected, given its 2007 
self-restricting ruling that reviewing constitutional amendments and acts falls 
beyond its mandate. 
 However, the country would have avoided a huge insurgency if the Court 
had decided to refrain from its 2007 ruling and given itself with the power to 
review, and nullify, the constitutionality of Morsi’s 2012 Unilateral Declaration. 
Further, a judicial precedent whereby the Court nullified the 2012 Declaration 
and established the Court’s authority to review the constitutionality of 
constitutional amendment would have acted as a safeguard against any attempt to 
subvert the meaning and purpose of the non-self-entrenched provision of Article 
266, Section 5 in the 2014 Constitution, rendering it an informal entrenchment 
provision preventing future constitutional fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
 Undoubtedly, Egypt’s constitutional drafters were not subtle in drafting 
Article 226, Section 5 as a non-self-entrenched provision. In a country such as 
Egypt, where people are still trudging towards democracy after two popular 
uprisings, a non-self-entrenched constitutional provision that shields some of the 
most high-valued constitutional principles must be protected from sabotage 
amendments and wicked intentions. 
                                                             
202 The Supreme Judicial Council stated the declaration was an “unprecedented assault on 
the independence of the judiciary and its rulings.” Egypt's top judges slam Morsi's new 
powers, CBS NEWS, Nov. 24, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-
57553859/egypts-top-judges-slam-morsis-new-powers/?pageNum=2. 
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 Formal amendment rules could bear the solution for this problem. For 
example, Article 226, Section 5 could be amended to avoid formal amendment 
by adding the phrase, “and this Section may not be amended.” Likewise, formal 
amendment rules could be used to introduce a constitutional amendment to the 
text of Article 192 of the Constitution, which determines the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, granting the Court the power to proactively check 
the constitutionality of constitutional amendments before they come into force. 
 Further, the idea of the Court’s supremacy in constitutional interpretation 
could be used to introduce an amendment to either the Court’s law or the 
Constitution itself in such a way that allows the Court to exercise a proactive 
judicial review whenever a constitutional amendment is proposed. Such an 
amendment could introduce a mechanism wherein the government is obliged to 
refer the proposed constitutional amendment to the Court for review before it 
comes into effect.
203
 The mechanism is well known in Canada: the Canadian 
government referred an issue to the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re 
Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, and the Court held that the Constitution could not 
be amended to change the duration of senatorial terms.
204
 
 One other possible solution is that the Supreme Constitutional Court 
departs from its 2007 ruling and extends its jurisdiction by holding that reviewing 
the constitutionality of constitutional amendments falls within its duties as a 
court of last resort in constitutional matters. One could argue that the executive 
and the legislature would most likely challenge such an unprecedented ruling, 
saying that the Court stepped beyond its jurisdiction as laid down in the 
Constitution and the Court’s Law no. 48/1979.205 However, such an argument 
could be refuted on the grounds that the Court’s decisions are final and cannot be 
appealed. 
 Finally, Egyptian constitutional jurisprudence needs to step up its 
rhetoric by promoting the idea of reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments through the condemnation of the dangers of a non-self-entrenched 
constitutional provision that it may lead to a fraud upon the constitution. 
                                                             
203 See Richard Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada, QUEEN’S L.J. (forthcoming, 2016). 
204 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc32/2014scc32.html.  
205 See Abdelaal, supra note 194. 
